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ABSTRACT 
The state of Arizona and the bordering towns of northern Mexico acknowledge the need 
for capability planning. They recognize the benefits of bi-national response and 
collaborative sharing of resources in times of disaster. Municipalities in southern Arizona 
and northern Mexico are taking a preventive approach and have created the Bi-National 
Arizona Emergency Response Task Force (BAERTF). The goal of the BAERTF is to 
deliver a timely, supportive response and automatic, mutual-aid capability to any 
jurisdiction in the state of Arizona or northern Mexico that experiences a disaster, 
terrorist-based or otherwise, that overwhelms the local response on either side of the 
border. Consequently, the expertise and application of the task force will be all-hazard 
(natural disasters, man-made disasters, and terrorist acts), adhering to the U.S. federal 
vision of comprehensive emergency management achieved through integrated emergency 
management systems both in the United States and Mexico. The intent is to address a 
perennial problem faced by small jurisdictions in both countries when dealing with 
disasters: events of any magnitude may quickly outstrip the ability of the jurisdiction and 
its local mutual aid to respond effectively while waiting for federal response. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................................................................2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................3 
D. CASE STUDY ................................................................................................11 
1. NAFTA................................................................................................12 
2. Training ..............................................................................................13 
3. Evaluation...........................................................................................16 
4. Results .................................................................................................21 
II. THE ARIZONA/MEXICO BI-NATIONAL RAPID RESPONSE PLAN ...........23 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................23 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM ..................................................24 
C. CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING FRAMEWORK ...........................25 
D. PURPOSE AND SCOPE...............................................................................26 
1. Strategic Plan .....................................................................................26 
2. Bi-National Response Capacity Building.........................................27 
3. Response Area Hazard Analysis.......................................................28 
4. Joint Response Efforts.......................................................................29 
E. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES .......................................................................31 
1. Strategic Goal # 1: Collaboration.....................................................31 
2. Strategic Goal #2: Training...............................................................32 
3. Strategic Goal #3: Communications.................................................32 
4. Strategic Goal #4: Chain of Command............................................33 
F. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED 
STRATEGIC PLAN ......................................................................................34 
G. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................35 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................37 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................39 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Strategy Canvas: DHS Homeland Bi-National First Response Program ........30 
Figure 2. ER2C Grid: DHS Homeland Bi-National First Response................................31 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
BAERTF  Bi-national Arizona Emergency Response Task Force  
 
CBRNE  Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
 
DHS   Department of Homeland Security 
 
EMS   Emergency Management System 
 
EPA   Environmental Protection Agency 
 
EMT   Emergency Medical Technician 
 
FEMA   Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
GNEB   Good Neighbor Environmental Board 
 
HazMat  Hazardous Materials 
 
IAFF   International Association of Fire Fighters  
 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement 
 
NIMS   National Incident Management System 
 
PPE   Personal Protective Equipment 
 
RSF   Registration Survey Form  
 
WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The process of creating a thesis was a team effort. If not for the help and support 
of the professors, thesis advisors, and editor, fellow students in 0905–0906, and friends 
and family at work and home, this eighteen-month project would not have come to 
completion.  
I was honored and humbled when accepted to this prestigious program at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, and could not 
have completed the program or this thesis without the love and support of my parents, 
Larry and Lupe Anderson. My parents and family never wavered in their encouragement; 
they continually urged me on to completion, regardless of the personal cost. This has 
been quite a journey, and I am professionally and personally better for having traveled 
this difficult road. The long weeknights sitting at the computer after work and countless 
hours over the weekends and on holidays were all sacrificed at the expense of family 
time. I cannot thank my family enough.  
To the Tucson Fire Department, my friends and co-workers (Station1 and 
Battalion 1) who understood when I could not spend time with them during this process 
and who supported me and gave me words of encouragement the entire way, I thank all 
of you!   
I would also like to thank my classmates who continued to check on me 
throughout the entire program; all of you are extremely bright and talented people, and I 
am blessed to not only call you my classmates but my friends. You’re the best!   
To the Naval Postgraduate School faculty, administrative staff, and members, 
your dedication to me as an individual and to the study of homeland security were 
exceptional.  
I owe heartfelt thanks to Dr. William Pelfrey for giving me this opportunity and 
having the faith in my abilities, and to Dr. Lauren Wollman and Richard Bergin for 
guiding me throughout my thesis.  
 
 xiv
Finally, to all first responders who make supreme sacrifices each and every day 
by placing themselves on the frontlines, thank you! 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, caused all segments of government to 
examine their response capabilities between the United States and Mexico. The primary 
challenge is to balance an effective border security system with adequate emergency 
responses. The Tucson border sector covers 262 miles of unsecured area between the 
United States and Mexico. Although 262 miles seems minimal in comparison to the 
nearly 7,000 miles of border between Canada and the United States, the Tucson sector 
experiences the highest level of illegal activity on our border (United States Census 
Bureau [Census Bureau] 2000). Arizona and Mexico lack a comprehensive bi-national 
emergency response plan, instead relying on the assets of major metropolitan areas on 
either side of the border to respond to any event.  
This reliance on current assets has significant shortcomings: most jurisdictions 
and emergency first-responder units are already short staffed, which puts them at a 
disadvantage during normal activity that is compounded in a natural disaster or terrorist 
attack. Second, structural rescue, especially in a hazardous atmosphere, requires special 
equipment and training that the majority of the departments, especially in Mexico, do not 
have. Due to the potential scale of either a terrorist attack or a natural disaster, no single 
department can provide the resources to correctly staff and equip an effective response 
team. Because the threat to public safety now includes weapons that are potentially 
available to terrorists, many threat scenarios require effective first-response 
communications among not only law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services, 
but also public works, transportation, critical infrastructure, and military organizations 
(Miller et al., 2005, p.13). 
There is a great need for a bi-national partnership to increase emergency-response 
capacity through knowledge exchange events designed to enhance cooperation, 
strengthen bi-national contingency plans at the local, state, regional, and national levels, 
and reduce the risk of emergencies and disasters throughout the Arizona border region. 
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As Paul Ganster, GNEB Chair, stated in Seven Years Later: Is the U.S.-Mexico 
Border Prepared for Environmental Disaster, “On the emergency response front, unequal 
levels of training, funding and technological access are key considerations. In order to 
properly protect U.S. citizens, we need to make sure that Mexican communities have 
excellent training and equipment to deal with emergencies like chemical spills.” At its 
extreme, some Mexican first responders are virtually without resources. Firemen were 
among the municipal employees who reportedly did not receive paychecks for at least 
two months this fall in the border town of Palomas, Chihuahua. Apart from funding, 
Ganster has said that responding to environmental emergencies in a border region 
presents other challenges, such as obtaining visas for response personnel or moving 
equipment across political borders (Paterson, 2008). 
The region’s vulnerability can be discerned locally on both sides of the United 
States/Mexico border; an incident on either side rapidly becomes an international incident 
and the threat of a chemical or biological release into the atmosphere, whether accidental 
or with criminal intent, knows no administrative boundaries. It becomes a shared 
responsibility to protect and provide security to both portions of the population in this 
area. Some emergencies may exceed the response capability of both parties, which would 
then require intergovernmental cooperation, as well as immediate access to or 
establishment of procedures for the use of foreign resources in order to facilitate a quick 
and effective response, especially in cases where the resources of the affected party are 
inadequate to meet the emergency. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What can we learn from the Arizona-Mexico Bi-National Training and Response 
Program, and how might similar programs improve bilateral preparedness and response? 
In order to respond to this primary research question, this thesis will also seek to 
answer the following subsidiary questions: 
1. How do we deliver a timely supportive response to any jurisdiction on 
either side of the United States–Mexico border that experiences disaster, 
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whether it is terrorist-based or otherwise overwhelms the local ability to 
respond before federal response arrives? 
2. How can sharing resources among all United States and Mexican 
municipalities provide automatic and mutual-aid capability? 
3. How can an appropriate communication linkage and information sharing 
system between border municipalities be established in order to provide 
for better interoperability? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The ability to predict and prevent crime and terrorism is enhanced by 
understanding the connections that reach beyond state and national borders, rather than 
simply reacting to such incidents. Such understanding also helps to narrow the gaps 
between potential threats and the ability to address those threats. Underlying themes of 
sharing information and local agency efforts to collect, evaluate, and save relevant data 
into multiple computer systems that are unable to share information are determining 
organizational components in the effectiveness of any government’s functioning. They 
lack compatible programming software exchange capability. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) understands that barriers to interoperable communications are 
both technical and operational. 
In most government systems, relationships are defined bureaucratically, rather 
than by interactions among agents and other networking agencies. In order to be able to 
accomplish strategic homeland security goals, collaborative interactions should involve 
interagency efforts to solve problems and a system of interoperability based on the 
establishment of trust. There is a need to remove impediments to information sharing in 
the community and to establish polices that reflect the need to share (versus the need to 
know) for all intelligence information and agencies involved. 
Effectiveness in critical situations results from the ability to quickly access 
relevant, targeted information. The ability to receive and understanding this information 
identifies critical infrastructure or key resources for threat and vulnerability. 
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No government agency could manage a large-scale catastrophe on its own. Each 
of the various local, state, and federal agencies tasked with emergency management has 
only part of the resources or knowledge needed to address a wide-ranging disaster along 
the borders, a disaster that might affect businesses, transportation nodes, utility 
infrastructures, water and food supplies, law enforcement, hospitals and medical services, 
communications networks, and other crucial services (Himberger, 2007). 
Experience offers important lessons for anyone responsible for managing the 
response to an emergency. Many leaders understand that their success depends on their 
ability to work with a multitude of government, business, and civil-sector organizations 
with have shared interests (Himberger, 2007, p. 3). 
The most effective way to manage this is by creating partnerships and alliances 
across organizations, without compromising each organization’s imperatives and legal 
responsibilities (Himberger, 2007, p. 4). 
Preparation for a catastrophic event is the key to a rapid, effective response. A 
successful response in the immediate aftermath of a disaster is the linchpin in a sound, 
long-term recovery. So, for example, although we cannot control the weather, we can 
manage and mitigate the impact of dangerous weather throughout our state (Kettl, 2003, 
p. 5). The most effective response is one that starts at the local level and grows with the 
support of surrounding communities, state agencies, and, if necessary, the federal 
government. The bottom-up approach yields the best and quickest results — saving lives, 
protecting property, and getting life back to normal as rapidly as possible. This approach 
also recognizes that government alone cannot effectively respond to a disaster, nor can 
government afford to maintain a full-time cavalry of emergency-response workers 
capable of managing a wide range of potential catastrophic events (Mouton, n.d.). 
The emergency-management community benefits from the scale offered by 
coordinating regional and national efforts. The approach of emergency planners to 
creating a community that will experience minimal losses following a disaster must take 
into consideration many factors. Among those considerations lies the need to recognize 
how some factors impact others. This insight is essential to developing a plan that will 
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employ a multifaceted approach. Three such factors to be considered include earth, 
human, and constructed systems. All three of these elements exist in every community 
and are dependent on one another to maintain a stable society. Each of these factors 
requires the emergency planner to take a focused approach. Earth systems are unique to 
each region and will basically dictate safe locations for the planning of residential and 
commercial projects. The human system is more diverse by nature because it requires 
education and must cross cultural boundaries. Finally, constructed systems are those 
factors that drive the construction of buildings in a particular area based on risk potential. 
Diverse organizations can share information; track resources and supplies in real time; 
establish mobile command centers; collaborate on preparation, training, relief, and 
recovery operations; and avoid working at cross-purposes (Gerenscer, 2006). 
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, for example, the U.S. government placed 
an explicit emphasis on interoperability, information sharing, and cross-agency 
collaboration. Billions of dollars went into planning activities, training, exercises, and 
communications systems. But four years later, officials at the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) were unprepared for an event of the scale and complexity 
of Hurricane Katrina. They had not taken sufficient steps to prevent or minimize the 
hurricane’s damage; they were not prepared to evacuate citizens; they could not marshal 
the enormous reservoir of public- and private-sector resources required for timely relief; 
and today, they are not demonstrating the national capacity to help the region recover 
(Gerenscer, 2006, p. 8). This approach requires that major actors explicitly reexamine the 
traditional boundaries defining their roles and responsibilities and that government 
agencies look beyond themselves to the private sector and civil groups for important 
resources, leadership, and activities. For public officials, this means opening up the 
planning process, making others full partners in decision making, and curbing the desire 
to unilaterally prescribe solutions to achieve their goals through collaboration among full 
partners. 
Capabilities-based planning is a form of all-hazards planning. It addresses the 
growing uncertainty in the threat environment by using a wide range of possible 
scenarios to bound requirements and thereby reduce the tendency to fixate on any one 
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threat, hazard, or set of conditions. Target levels of capability will balance the potential 
threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the 
resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them (Bush 2003, p. 1). 
The cornerstone of homeland security is coordination—plugging the gaps 
between programs to minimize problems. In part, it is a problem of ensuring that key 
personnel, with the best training and equipment available, are involved at the scene of 
any incident—and preventing any confusion that occurs. In part, it is a problem of 
strengthening mutual aid among communities and taking a preventive attitude in the 
future. There should be strong coordination among functions and communities—and 
strong incentives to ensure that this will happen. This is especially true in the case of 
public health, which the state case studies demonstrate is a weak link in the homeland 
security chain (Kettl, 2003, p.13). 
Homeland security depends fundamentally on strengthening the ability of local 
first responders—such as firefighters, police officers, emergency technicians, and public 
health workers—to cope with rare and abnormal events. Officials in all the states concur 
that an “all-hazard” approach—strengthening the capacity of local governments to deal 
with a wide variety of dangers, including terrorism—is the foundation for a successful 
strategy. Determining just how much preparedness and protection to invest in is, 
inevitably, a daunting problem. No amount of investment can provide complete certainty. 
Little investment might seem to be a reasonable risk because the odds of an attack, 
especially outside the nation’s major population centers, could indeed be low (Kettl, 
2003, p. 14). 
The September 11 attacks made clear the central role that state and local 
governments play in homeland security. Any attack is, first and foremost, an attack on a 
city and a state. The first workers to arrive on the scene are local firefighters, police 
officers, emergency technicians, and public health experts. The federal government has 
been developing a homeland defense strategy and has created a new department to 
execute it. None of that will matter, however, unless state and local governments are a 
strong and effective part of the plan. On that awful September morning, some of the 
nation’s best local forces struggled to deal with the challenges of the attacks. In the 
 7
aftermath, state and local officials around the country looked at their own capacity to face 
such events and discovered they had a long way to go. State and local governments 
have complained that they cannot improve their preparedness without more money (Kettl, 
2003, p. 7). 
As the federal, state, and local governments frame this new strategy, the Century 
Foundation reports underscore the need for immediate investment in three areas: 
However, state and local governments have done relatively little to prevent or deter 
attacks. For that, they are looking to the federal government. But most state and local 
governments complain that the federal government has done little more than tell them to 
increase their readiness without providing a clear message of what to look out for or 
where to be most ready. In addition, the reports present powerful evidence that: 
The system now has substantial gaps in coordination. More money is 
needed to plug those gaps. But simply putting more money into the system 
is not likely to close the gaps unless the system fundamentally changes. 
The state governments must become key players in enhancing local 
preparedness. Building the system we need requires a new strategy for 
federal grants for homeland security. (Kettl, 2003, p. 7)  
Some of the features required include:  
1) an enhanced public health capacity, closely integrated into the nation’s 
frontline first-response system, to improve protection against biological and radiological 
threats;  
2) a personnel policy matched to the problem, since many state and local 
governments know what they need to do but lack the staff to do it; and 
3) communication capacity to ensure that first responders can communicate 
with one another in the event of an emergency. (Kettl, 2003) 
Substantial aid must undoubtedly be targeted to where the needs are greatest, but 
state and local governments across the country need investment in these long-neglected 
and critically important areas. Many emergency-management officials across the country 
are frustrated by the federal government’s new grant rules and procedures. They are also 
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concerned that the difficulty of bringing the vast array of federal agencies into a new 
Department of Homeland Security is making it difficult for the federal government to 
bring a unified voice to its partnership with state and local governments (Kettl, 2003, 
p. 7). 
Improving information sharing with trusted collaborative partnerships among 
local, state, and federal law enforcement, and the military, as well as fire services, the 
private sector, and tribal governments requires collaboration in integrating human and 
technological components across disciplines and levels of government and a statewide 
focus, with particular emphasis upon critical infrastructure, weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD/CBRNE), and homeland security. The commitment to detect, prevent, disrupt, 
preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against the United States is a national goal 
of the United States.  
The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States (9/11 Commission Report) offered suggestions for the creation of a director 
of national intelligence and various forms of reorganization aimed at nurturing an 
environment of information sharing in order to produce enhanced tracking and 
forewarning of future attacks. The dialogue regarding intelligence cooperation and 
sharing ultimately led to the concept of fusion centers. Some of the other suggestions 
included the need to enable the outside intelligence community (such as police, 
correction officers, and border patrol officers) with valuable counterterrorism information 
in order to contribute to the national counterterrorism effort and the creation of an 
information sharing environment in which access to terrorism information is matched to 
the roles, responsibilities, and missions of all organizations engaged in countering 
terrorism and is timely, accessible, and relevant to their needs (Townsend & Henke, 
2009). It was also recommended that impediments to information sharing in the 
community be removed and that polices be established that reflect the need to share 
(versus the need to know) for all data, thereby removing the “ownership” by agency of 
intelligence information. (Townsend & Henke, 2009).  
In the article “Complexity Leadership Theory: An Interactive Perspective in 
Complex Adaptive Systems,” the authors state, “In such systems, relationships are not 
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primarily defined hierarchically, as they are in bureaucratic systems, but rather by 
interactions among heterogeneous agents and across network agents” (Lichtenstein et al., 
2006, p. 3). In order to accomplish strategic homeland security goals, these interactions 
should involve interagency collaborative efforts to solve problems and a system of 
interoperability based on the establishment of trust. 
The government entities of several states agree that they do not have enough 
resources to meet the homeland security challenge, and they place the blame squarely on 
the federal government. They not only contend that homeland security presents new 
problems that demand additional money, but they also worry that any new money would 
replace existing programs and leave gaps elsewhere in their emergency response systems. 
Below the surface, however, is the predictable struggle between local governments for 
money. Wisconsin, for example, has a large number of local governments, and homeland 
security has created a new arena in which they are competing for cash. No state has 
successfully asked—or answered—the question about how best to target any new money 
to ensure that new resources would produce better security (Kettl, 2003, p. 12). 
Part of the challenge for homeland defense and homeland security organizations 
lies in the uncertainty about what to adapt to—a threat being too ambiguous and diverse 
to easily identify (Kettl, 2003, p. 3). Because terrorist threat actors are both cunning and 
adaptive, relying on surprise to overcome security measures, military and security 
planners must embrace a more flexible, comprehensive, and comprehensible approach to 
contingency planning – a method based on neither threats nor scenarios exclusively, but 
rather on integrating these two approaches into a planning process based on capabilities. 
After 9/11, many homeland security planners tried a different approach to 
contingency planning by using a “scenario-based” planning process that focused on what 
events could happen. This approach was based on “what if” drills. The process of this 
scenario-based approach was best seen at the Salt Lake City Olympics, which 
demonstrates the advantages of this method of planning: it is simple to execute and 
modifiable based on the scenarios selected. These “what if” contingency plans have the 
additional benefit of not requiring a detailed threat assessment, as issues and questions 
concerning the threat can be mitigated by making assumptions to fit the scenario. Though 
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conceptually simple, and therefore attractive for initial planning efforts, this approach 
does have weaknesses because effective “scenario-based” planning requires certainty 
about possible scenarios and a limited number of scenarios to plan against (Kettl, 2003, 
p. 4). 
This effort has run into resistance from homeland security planners who claim 
that “one size does not fit all.” The scenario-based approach claims flexibility with “ways 
that allow them to be adapted to local conditions,” but it offers a framework of set tasks 
and agency roles that cannot be easily modified. City planners and decision makers are 
quick to point out that each city is in fact unique in its infrastructure, assets, resources, 
and vulnerability. The challenge for any scenario-based approach is to be able to 
anticipate with certainty that the scenarios developed will be the scenarios faced. That 
certainty is a rare and perishable commodity in the diverse planning community that 
addresses the multifaceted and ambiguous threats to the U.S. homeland. Therefore, 
neither “threat-based” nor “scenario-based” planning will work effectively for homeland 
defense or homeland security planning because the asymmetric threat cannot be used as a 
template. Advocates of capabilities-based planning assert that it is this strong potential for 
the threat to achieve surprise by asymmetric means that makes both threat-based and 
scenario-based planning a poor match for the needs of emerging planning challenges like 
homeland defense and homeland security (Goss, 2005, p. 7) 
A new conceptual approach that combines the strengths of threat-based and 
scenario-based thinking needs to be found to structure and assess threats in homeland 
security and homeland defense contingency planning. A solution to this challenge can be 
found in the concepts of “lines of operation” and “capabilities” as dynamics to define and 
explain potential and likely interactions. As opposed to the spatial or temporal divisions 
of the battle space by borders, or domains like air and seas, and phasing like build-up, 
defense, and offense, homeland defense campaigns are shaped by a reactive concept to 
threat actions and the division of the threat into potential lines of operation. “Lines of 
operation” is defined by the Department of Defense as “lines that define the directional 
orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy.” For homeland defense 
and homeland security operations, these lines of operation can be modified to address 
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distinct and related methods of both attack and defense, such as “maritime attacks” or 
“attacks on continuity of government.” These lines of operation for the threat can then be 
defined and depicted in terms of specific capabilities. The Department of Defense 
dictionary defines a “capability” as “the ability to execute a specific course of action (a 
capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention).” Having a capability implies 
the ability to perform a set of tasks required to accomplish the mission requiring the 
capability. This definition, intentionally very broad, covers both capabilities involved in 
strategic organizational issues (like force sizing and procurement) and operational issues 
(such as tactics and weapon performance). For this article, a capability is defined as the 
ability to perform a specified task within the conditions and performance standards 
accepted for that mission set. Therefore, the capability to conduct a “swarm boat attack” 
includes the ability to plan and execute multiple simultaneous attacks on maritime targets 
using small boats, with an expectation of causing significant damage to the targets. 
However, it is important to highlight that this does not imply that the group with this 
capability has the plan or the intent to use this specific capability in its next attack (Goss, 
2005, p. 7). 
D. CASE STUDY 
The Arizona-Mexico Bi-National Training and Response Program (the Bi-
National program) was established in 2004 in an effort to address the disparity of 
resources available to small communities and emergency response personnel in a highly 
tenuous region. This program encompassed the participation of first responders of the 
shared regional boundaries between the state of Arizona and the United Mexican States. 
The program developed it’s a curriculum, resulting in a multiagency plan to organize and 
ensure effective prevention and corrective efforts of on-scene first responders, emergency 
managers, critical stakeholders, and political leaders along the United States–Mexico 
border. This plan required the collective efforts of many organizations and global parties 




The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
increased movement and traffic dramatically on both sides of the United States–Mexico 
border but did not provide the appropriate protection to many citizens who were 
adversely affected by this change. Mexico has historically had limited emergency 
management training, and much of the equipment its local departments use has been 
donated from Arizona organizations such as the Tucson Fire Department.  
The threat of a chemical or biological release into the atmosphere, whether 
accidental or with criminal intent, knows no artificial international boundaries; thus the 
concentration in the bi-national program was on insuring that both sides obtained the 
correct training and equipment in order to fully understand the fundamentals of dealing 
with the pressures of a hazardous material (HazMat) situation. The development and 
implementation of such a program was also seen as a true test because of its 
unprecedented and innovative nature, one that would require extensive planning and 
preparation and careful, multilayered collaboration.  
In July 2004, two southern Arizona senior firefighters were watching a television 
broadcast of a first-responder Hazmat situation and rescue taking place in Mexico. They 
began to discuss the manner in which these first responders were handling the situation; 
the responders had good intensions of rescuing the victim, but because of lack of training, 
lack of proper equipment, and appropriate measures that were not taken, the responders 
risked becoming victims themselves. Of course, every rescue starts with good intentions, 
but with lack of training a first responder can easily become a victim. After a long 
discussion, these two firefighters, John and Chris, came to the realization that the lack of 
training experienced by those involved in rescue attempts on the border was an issue 
worth pursuing. Most border cities are undersized and greatly lack the training and 
resources necessary for the proper prevention of potential breaches or disasters, as well as 
the execution of imperative security and effective emergency response time. A majority 
of these cities and towns often rely on appropriate support and expertise from 
neighboring departments that are suitably equipped to address vital crisis issues; 
however, it can often take a long time before helped arrives.  
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After much discussion, these firefighters began a bottoms-up, grassroots effort to 
generate a cooperative effort among other firefighters and various elected officials 
representing the jurisdictions involved, including key staff from the local offices of 
emergency management and homeland security. A detailed plan with a funding source 
was presented to the Arizona Governor’s Office of Homeland Security. All parties agreed 
that the plan was vital, and it was put into place without hesitation. It was anticipated that 
the training would be conducted on both sides of the border, in Mexico and the United 
States. 
In addition to the governor’s office, stakeholders included all emergency 
managers on both sides of the border and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The 
governor’s office worked with various agencies, such as political officials of the target 
area, for buy-in and to give credibility to the effort. The project initiators worked on the 
curriculum and provided training instructors, who needed to be certified in the 
instructional methodologies and also bilingual in English and Spanish. The plan was also 
presented to the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) for their support: the 
overwhelming response of that organization also included an agreement to provide 
funding and lodging for the instructors. 
In the preliminary stages of planning the training, there were concerns about 
carrying training materials across the border, including possible problems during border 
inspection. However, the joint effort of the program was realized, and the transportation 
of all training materials proceeded smoothly thanks to the supportive staff at the border. 
2. Training 
It was agreed that the training to be provided would include hazardous materials, 
first-responder operations, confined-space rescue, and weapons of mass destruction. This 
instruction is identical to the type that first responders receive in major metropolitan areas 
across the United States. The program adopted the IAFF HazMat/WMD training 
department's mission “to educate emergency responders about strategies to safeguard 
their health and safety, and reduce occupational deaths and injuries related to hazardous 
materials and weapons of mass destruction response, so they can better protect the 
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communities they serve.” Portions of the IAFF curriculum were also adopted for the 
training. Supplemental components were also added to the program so that it would be 
entirely comprehensive.  
The course training provides the tools needed to protect responder health and 
safety, while covering basic defensive actions, personal protective equipment, hazard 
recognition and identification, pre-incident planning, and scene management. This 
training facilitated group activities and real-life case studies. The specialized training 
utilized a modular format in which a first-responder agency can analyze its current level 
of competency and choose course modules that will provide the skills needed by its 
hazardous materials team. Training includes procedures for mitigation of hazardous 
materials spills, leaks, and exposures. Topics include chemistry, detection devices, 
advanced recognition and identification, pre-incident planning, incident management, 
scene evaluation and termination, terrorism, toxicology, medical surveillance, emergency 
care, PPE usage and limitations, and decontamination. In addition, the training takes a 
risk-based personal scene safety and health approach to incidents of terrorism involving 
chemical and biological agents, nuclear, radioactive, and explosive devices, and their 
impact on first responders. This course encouraged participation through a variety of 
team activities, class discussions, and case studies, as well as a practical exercise. The 
interactive, problem-solving approach to hazardous materials included refresher 
information throughout each unit, reinforcing basic response protocols. 
The curriculum encompassed five days of training, eight hours a day. With hands-
on drills and chemical release simulations, each city or town could evaluate and perform 
a community needs assessment of potential WMD targets (abortion clinics, churches, 
etc.). 
In October of 2004, the initial offering of courses began. A interested response 
was tremendous response, and it was decided that no one would be turned away. As a 
result, the class sessions carried out by this program were open and attended by a myriad 
of various public safety and law enforcement personnel, as well as U.S. Border and 
Customs agents. The classes had to be extended, and a second session was offered at later 
dates in the bigger cities so that everyone interested could attend.  
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The first training session took place just outside of Yuma, Arizona, in the small 
border community of San Luis. the students were issued day visas to the United States for 
the training. As soon as that first seminar was complete, word spread extensively and 
quickly about this unique training opportunity. There were continuous challenges 
encountered involving lack of equipment, outdated equipment, and a fundamentally 
deficient understanding regarding certain equipment, but these obstacles were tackled 
with enthusiasm: eventually the program was able to assist with training not only in the 
use, but even the maintenance and contribution, of such equipment. 
The second training session was conducted in Douglas, Arizona, in November 
and December of 2004. It was very humbling to see the equipment that the student 
firefighters and first responders had to work with, not realizing danger they put 
themselves in on an everyday basis. The instructors assisted in repairing the equipment to 
make it effective and functional. 
When the third training session was made available in Nogales, Arizona, in 
February through April 2005, it garnered widespread local and national media attention 
since this particular assembly entailed a drill involving a successful chemical leak in 
Mexico that included active participation and communication from the U.S. side. After 
departing Nogales, coordinators from both nations drafted and approved a mutual aid 
agreement that allowed for the Nogales (Arizona) Fire Department to enter Mexico up to 
a certain restricted boundary and to provide assistance when needed, especially in the 
form of special attention and training regarding the maquilladoras and military situations. 
(Periodic continued education was requested until 2007.) 
This crucial instructional course began in 2004 and was completely finished by 
early 2007. Altogether, more than 300 first responders (40–50 per class) from both sides 
of the border were trained at no additional cost to the state of Arizona or Mexico and its 
citizens, representing a completely collaborative effort on the part of many organizations, 
governments, and individuals at all levels. Through 2007 the instructors were continually 
asked to return periodically for refresher courses, as well as for additional training in 
deficient areas. Safety personnel realized and understood the dangers they are confronted 
with, and they can now correctly utilize the necessary tools and procedures to help avert 
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threats while protecting themselves, their communities, and their borders. The training 
also provided the reassurance that two sides along international boundaries can come 
together, recognize universal necessities, and establish a formal working agreement 
directed toward the achievement of common goals. 
The large number of responders who participated in the program demonstrates the 
great interest and need for emergency response training. The program itself, although not 
unique, provided an individualized experience in which law enforcement, public health, 
and public and private agencies came together to train in emergency response and 
perceived roles. As people were introduced and peers interacted, response roles and 
responsibilities were described, understood, and respected. 
3. Evaluation 
To properly prepare for and respond to a hazard, bioterrorism, or other urgent 
public threats or emergencies, first-responder agencies must work together in well-
coordinated efforts to address the preparedness needs of their communities and the 
nation. The need for preparedness has brought key emergency response partners together 
into new working partnerships to achieve common training objectives. The evaluation 
instrument was a pre- and post-test comparison of actual class impacts against the agreed 
training to gauge the knowledge base of these topics. This device gave the instructors the 
ability to measure the purpose, strengths, and weaknesses of the training. 
The following were the questions asked in the pre- and post-test instrument: 
1.  What is your gender? 
 A) Male 
 B) Female 
 
2.  What is your ethnic background? 
 A) African American 
 B) Asian/Pacific Islander 
 C) Caucasian 
 D) Hispanic 
 E) Native American 
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3.  Select highest level completed. 
A) Grade School 
 B) High School 
 C) Some College 
 D) Associate Degree 
 E) Bachelor’s Degree 
 F) Post Bachelor’s Degree 
 G) Master’s Degree 
 H) Post Master’s Degree 
 
4. Which of the following describes your present employer? 
 A) Fire Service 
 B) Law Enforcement 
 C) Industrial Fire Brigade 
 D) Private Industry/Consultant 
 E) Private EMS 
 F) Public Safety 
 G) Emergency Management 
H) Public EMS 
I) Other  
 
5.  How many years have you have been involved in the Fire/Rescue service? 
A) Not applicable 
B) Less than one year 
C) 1 - 5 years 
D) 6 - 10 years 
E) 11 - 15 years 
F) 16 - 20 years 
G) Over 20 years 
 
6. Please mark the choice that BEST describes your current position. 
A) Probationary Firefighter (Recruit, Trainee) 
B) EMS Provider (Paramedic, EMT or First Responder) 
C) Driver/Operator 
D) Company Officer (Lieutenant , Captain or Sergeant) 
E) Chief Officer (Battalion, Assistant, Deputy, etc.) 
F) HazMat Team Member 
G) Fire Service Trainer 
H) Private Consultant 
I) Law Enforcement 
 J) Other 
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7. Years of experience in CURRENT position (as listed in question number 6)
 A) Less than 1 year 
 B) 1–5 years 
 C) 6–10 years 
 D) 11–15 years 
 E) 16–20 years 
 F) Over 20 years 
 




C) Not applicable 
 
9. What is the total number of personnel in your department/place of employment?
 A) 50 or fewer personnel 
 B) 51–100 personnel 
 C) 101–250 personnel 
 D) 251–500 personnel 
 E) 501–1000 personnel 
 F) Over 1000 personnel 
 
10. How many calls do you typically respond to each month? 
A) Not applicable 
B) Fewer than 10 calls 
C) 11–30 calls 
D) 31–40 calls 
E) Over 40 calls 
 
11. Have you previously taken training courses in hazardous materials emergency 
response? 
 A) Yes 
 B) No 
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12. If so, what training courses have you completed? (Mark all that apply.) 
A) First Responder Awareness 
B) WMD Awareness 
C) First Responder Operations 
D) WMD Operations  
E) HazMat Incident Management 
F) HazMat EMS 
G) HazMat Instructor 
H) Confined Space Operations 
I) Confined Space Rescue 
J) HazMat Technician 
K) HazMat Specialist 
L) No previous HazMat Emergency Response courses 
 
13. When was the last time your employer provided you with a medical exam? 
 A) Not applicable 
 B) Within the last 6 months 
 C) 6 months–1 year 
D) 1–2 years 
E) 2 or more years 
F) Never 
 
14. Was the exam provided because of hazardous materials exposure? 
 A) Yes 
 B) No 
 C) Not applicable/no exam 
 
15. Does your department have standard operating procedures or guidelines for 
responding to hazardous materials incidents? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Not applicable 
 
16. Have you preplanned sites or transportation routes where hazardous materials are 




17. If yes, how many times within the past year? 
 A) 0 times  
 B) 1 time 
C) 2–5 times 
D) 6–10 times 
E) More than 10 times 
F) Not involved in preplanning 
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19. If yes, how many times within the past year? 
 A) 0 times 
B) 1–10 times 
C) More than 10 times 
 




 C) Don’t know 
 
21. Have you ever been involved in a practice drill at an Environmental Protection 
Agency Superfund site? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
 C)  Don’t know 
 
Reactions to Course 
We need your reaction to the material offered in this course. Your responses will 
improve the quality of the course. Be assured that once the results from the class are 
tabulated, all personal identifiers will be dropped to ensure confidentiality. 
Using the scale “A–E” below, provide your response to each of the following 
statements.  
Fill in the appropriate circles of the Registration Survey Form. 




E) Strongly disagree 
  
22. The sections of the course were well organized. 
23. The Power Points, videotapes, and handouts enhanced the program. 
24. There were many opportunities for me to participate. 
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25. The training will be valuable in helping me to do my job in a safer manner. 
26. There was adequate time to cover each topic. 
27. The course content was clear to me. 
28. The quality of instruction was good. 
29. The overall quality of the course was good. 
4. Results 
In the pretest given to all individuals who attended the training, less than 10% had 
a minimal passing score. The majority of the students failed. 
In the post-test the majority of the students passed, met, or exceeded a 70% 
passing score. 
Follow-up tests were given a year later. Instructors traveled to each town where 
training was conducted and  provided continuing education; they also conducted an 
annual post-test to evaluate material to maintain skills had been retained. The majority of 
the information had been retained, and thereby decreased the amount of continuing 
education that was needed. Instructors also sent out training materials for further 
continuing education.  
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II. THE ARIZONA/MEXICO BI-NATIONAL RAPID RESPONSE 
PLAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The process of managing disasters presents a distinct set of challenges for any 
responder. How those challenges are met requires a distinct set of competencies to be 
identified and training to be developed to assure the delivery of those services following a 
disaster. For the emergency manager the process of creating training that is a true 
reflection of what will be necessary begins in the planning phases. The foundation lies in 
the identification of hazards and the associated risks of mitigating those hazards during 
the response phase. This being said, the development of disaster training takes on a 
customized approach that reflects the resources available, the hazards to be trained for, 
and the partnerships involved (Alexander, 2002). 
Unexpected security challenges have been identified due to the border between 
the United States and Mexico. The primary challenge is to balance an effective security 
system with adequate emergency responses. Arizona and Mexico currently lack a 
comprehensive international emergency response plan, instead relying on the current 
assets of major metropolitan areas on either side of the border to respond to any event and 
acknowledging the need for sister-city planning. The value of establishing a homeland 
security program along the Arizona-Mexico border is that it creates a simultaneous 
pursuit of differentiation in first-response services by designing a bi-national framework 
that recognizes border issues in order to better leverage first response and decimation 
processes between all jurisdictions in the event of a major incident that could potentially 
overwhelm local resources. The program aims to collaborate and eliminate duplication of 
services in order to create a more cost effective collaboration between the jurisdictions of 
Arizona and Mexico in times of local disasters and to take measures to reduce risks and 
mitigate incidents.  
The goal is to design a framework and task force, the Bi-National Arizona 
Emergency Response Task Force (BAERTF) to 1) establish a statewide resource to assist 
jurisdictions in both the United States and northern Mexico in responding to major 
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incidents that either have or could potentially overwhelm local resources; 2) deliver a 
timely, supportive response to any jurisdiction on either side of the Arizona-Mexico 
border that experiences a disaster, terrorist based or otherwise, that overwhelms the local 
response; 3) provide automatic/mutual aid capability and 4) establish an appropriate 
communications linkage between both countries. 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM 
On September 11, 2001, 2,996 lives were lost in the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon. Resources were deployed from across the nation to assist 
in the response and recovery operations. This event reminded us that we all share 
responsibility for homeland security. All levels of government across the nation need to 
prepare together, with private-sector support as appropriate, for major events that exceed 
the capabilities of any single entity. The American structure of overlapping federal, state, 
local, and tribal governance provides unique opportunities and challenges. Opportunities 
arise from the flexibility to explore differences and to share best practices across the 
nation. The challenge is to develop an interconnected and complementary “national” 
system that balances the need for flexibility with the need for accountability (United 
States Department of Homeland Security [Bush, 2003, p. 1).  
Unexpected security challenges have been identified between the United States 
and Mexico. The primary challenge is to balance an effective security system with 
adequate emergency responses. The Tucson border sector covers 262 miles of unsecured 
area between the United States and Mexico. Although 262 miles seems minimal in 
comparison to the nearly 7,000 miles of border between Canada and the United States, 
the Tucson sector experiences the highest level of illegal activity on the nation’s borders, 
(United States Census Bureau 2000). Arizona and Mexico currently lack a 
comprehensive international emergency response plan, instead relying on the current 
assets of major metropolitan areas on either side of the border to respond to any event.  
This reliance on current assets has significant shortcomings. Most jurisdictions 
and emergency first-responders units are already short staffed. This puts them at a 
disadvantage during normal activity, and this disadvantage could be compounded in a 
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natural disaster or terrorist attack. Second, structural rescue, especially in a hazardous 
atmosphere, requires special equipment and training that the majority of the departments 
lack, especially in Mexico. Due to the potential scale of either a terrorist attack or a 
natural disaster, no single department can provide the resources to correctly staff and 
equip an effective response team. 
The Bi-National Arizona Emergency Response Task Force will include the 
participation of first responders of the shared regional boundaries between the state of 
Arizona and Mexico. The purpose and focus of the BAERTF is rooted in the fact that the 
vast majority of border cities are undersized and lack the training and resources necessary 
for the proper prevention of potential border breaches, relying instead on neighboring 
departments and jurisdictions for appropriate support and expertise because those 
jurisdictions are more suitably equipped to address vital critical issues. The downside is 
that many of these areas have waited for long periods of time for assistance. Furthermore, 
the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) increased 
movement and traffic dramatically on both sides of the border, particularly through our 
railroad system, but did not provide appropriate protection to the many citizens adversely 
affected by this change.  
Mexico has historically had limited emergency management training, and much 
of the equipment used by its jurisdictions has been donated from Arizona organizations 
such as the Tucson Fire Department. Furthermore, the threat of a chemical or biological 
release into the atmosphere, whether accidental or with criminal intent, knows no 
artificial international boundaries. 
C. CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING FRAMEWORK  
Capabilities-based planning is a form of all-hazards planning. It addresses the 
growing uncertainty in the threat environment by using a wide range of possible 
scenarios to unify requirements and thereby reduce the tendency to fixate on any one 
threat, hazard, or set of conditions as discussed by the Department of Homeland Security 
in its Capabilities Based Planning Overview. “Target levels of capability will balance the 
potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies 
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with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them” (Bush, 2003). 
The challenge for homeland defense and homeland security organizations lies in the 
uncertainty about what to adapt to, with a threat that is too ambiguous and diverse to 
easily identify. Because terrorist threat actors are both cunning and adaptive, relying on 
surprise to overcome security measures, military and security planners must embrace a 
more flexible, comprehensive, and comprehensible approach to contingency planning – a 
method based on neither threats nor scenarios exclusively, but rather on integrating these 
two approaches into a planning process based on capabilities (Bush, 2003, p. 3). 
D. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The goal of the Bi-National Arizona Emergency Response Task Force is to 
deliver a timely, supportive response and automatic/mutual-aid capability to any 
jurisdiction in the state of Arizona or northern Mexico that experiences a disaster, 
terrorist-based or otherwise, that overwhelms the local response on either side of the 
border. Consequently, the expertise and application of the task force will be all-hazard 
(natural disasters, man-made disasters and terrorist acts), adhering to the U.S. federal 
vision of comprehensive emergency management achieved through integrated emergency 
management systems both in the United States and Mexico. The intent is to address a 
perennial problem faced by small jurisdictions in both countries when dealing with 
disasters: events of any magnitude may quickly outstrip the ability of the jurisdiction and 
its local mutual aid to respond effectively.  
1. Strategic Plan 
This strategy involves streamlining a capabilities-based framework to assist with 
an emergency response system and a multidisciplinary task force that will respond to 
breaches along our Arizona borders that will notify and help with communication efforts. 
The BAERTF members would cooperate with all levels of emergency response 
jurisdictions and personnel. Along with the reducing risks associated with hazardous 
materials, potential breaches, and disasters, the plan will incorporate necessary training in 
emergency response. The BAERTF will conduct and participate in emergency response 
“real life” exercises to ensure comprehensive and cohesive emergency response on both 
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sides of the border. This initiative will bring agency representatives together to form a 
collective allegiance. The training curriculum for this program includes Hazardous 
Materials First-Responder Operations, Confined Space Rescue, and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. The instruction is similar to the type that first responders receive in major 
metropolitan areas across the United States; however supplemental components will be 
added to our strategic plan to account for international laws and safety regulations. 
This plan calls for increased communication, coordination, and cooperation in 
response to an “all-hazard” incident in the Arizona-Mexico border area. The term “all-
hazards” refers to incidents that may involve hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, 
natural disasters, or other disasters that require the mobilization of a bi-national first-
response team. 
The overall plan is to provide a tool that facilitates more effective and efficient 
use of resources in the border area to prevent and respond to emergency situations in 
order to protect public health, safety, and the environment. 
It is not the intent of this plan to supersede any existing local, state, regional, or 
federal authorities or to plan when a disaster or emergency has been declared in the 
border area. Rather, the purpose is to complement existing local, state, regional, or 
federal plans and to better serve the local community by creating an infrastructure for 
responding to emergencies.  
2. Bi-National Response Capacity Building 
Proactive preparation is critical to ensuring an efficient incident response. This is 
especially true for bi-national border incidents that may encounter the additional 
challenges of resource scarcity, inclement weather, law enforcement and immigration 
concerns, and language barriers. This plan should be exercised to ensure that it is 
cohesive and accurate for current response activities. 
The jurisdictions involved include members from first-responder stakeholders on 
both sides of the border; they routinely conduct task force meetings, training, and 
exercises to help for future preparedness. Local agencies and first responders should 
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ensure that their own training and exercises are held regularly and include all bi-national 
participants. Such training and exercises are important to the stakeholders involved. They 
not only facilitate response capability building also but foster first-responder relationships 
that will be vital during responses to incidents. Planning, training, exercises, and other 
activities have been and will continue to be an integral part of building the border 
capacity for first responders to deal with bi-national incidents. 
From west to east, there are six ports of entry along the Arizona-Sonora border: 
• San Luis, Arizona–San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora 
• Lukeville, Arizona–Sonora, Sonora 
• Sasabe, Arizona–Sasabe, Sonora 
• Nogales, Arizona–Nogales, Sonora (East and West Gate) 
• Naco, Arizona–Naco, Sonora 
• Douglas, Arizona–Aqua Prieta, Sonora. 
3. Response Area Hazard Analysis 
Analysis of both the hazards posed in the plan area and measures to reduce the 
risks from these hazards is critical to emergency response and preparedness. This section 
identifies the hazards vulnerable to human and environmental resources and associated 
risks. This section also addresses the jurisdictions’ commitment to reduce risks from 
these hazards. An all-hazards approach identifies all potential natural or manmade 
disasters that may impact the area. Such an approach allows the first responder to use the 
basic response skills hazard analysis and response protocols for any type of hazard. 
Vulnerability assessment is the process used to analyze all hazards and to narrow 
the focus based on history and likelihood. A full vulnerability assessment was not 
conducted as a part of the development of this plan. The assessment done by the state will 
be applied to the plan area. 
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The following hazards and vulnerabilities were evaluated for the plan area: 
• Natural disasters; 
• Hazmat incidents; 
• Sensitive populations and vulnerable areas; 
• Population distribution; 
• Drinking water supplies and wastewater treatment; 
• Public health; 
• Counterterrorism. 
4. Joint Response Efforts 
When the magnitude of an incident exceeds local and state response capabilities, 
or when the response involves more than one state jurisdiction or federal land, the federal 
government will coordinate the response operation and provide assistance as necessary. 
When the United States and Mexico need to initiate a joint response to an incident, the 
function and responsibilities of joint response efforts should include: 
• Advising other jurisdictions about measures needed to respond to the 
incident and the resources that are available to carry out those measures; 
• Evaluating and making recommendations concerning the measures taken 
by yhr first-responding team; 
• Coordinating and using as appropriate the resources that agencies or 
persons from the United States or Mexico or a third party can contribute; 
• Assisting in preparing information releases for the public as needed; 
• Participating in the termination of the response. 
In a nonemergency mode, the BAERTF coordinates U.S.-Mexico border area 
planning and training activities. 
Under the National Incident Management System (NIMS), U.S. federal assistance 




authorities. If a presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency takes place, 
DHS will coordinate with all other U.S federal departments and act as the lead support 
management for the incident. 
 
Figure 1.   Strategy Canvas: DHS Homeland Bi-National First Response Program 
The application of best practice for large-scale strategic bi-national change will 
reconstruct the U.S.-Mexico boundaries while redefining jurisdictional collaboration. By 
adapting the bi-national framework goals, the focus can be placed on the big picture and 
on reaching beyond the demand while integrating with federal border policies. This 
preventive measure will overcome organizational hurdles by effectively working with a 
strategic jurisdictional collaboration to implement and institutionalize first-response 




Figure 2.   ER2C Grid: DHS Homeland Bi-National First Response 
E. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
1. Strategic Goal # 1: Collaboration 
This goal is to create a bi-national jurisdictional collaboration with all 
stakeholders involved to strengthen relationships while developing mitigation plans for 
the coordination of services with bi-national sister-city communities. 
1. Contact collaborating stakeholders and jurisdictions in the bi-national 
affected area; 
2. Prepare an inventory of natural and androgenic dangers existing in the 
area and identify cross-border threats; 
3. Develop bi-national response plans that support emergency response 
operations; 
4. Prepare an inventory of first responders, response equipment, and training 
received by a newly created bi-national collaboration task force; 
5. Share and exchange emergency preparedness information among the U.S.-
Mexico jurisdictions. 
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2. Strategic Goal #2: Training 
This goal focuses on the training and continued education necessary for BAERTF 
to develop and strengthen its expertise in delivering a timely, supportive response and 
automatic/mutual-aid capability to any jurisdiction in the state of Arizona or northern 
Mexico. BAERTF will implement the following:  
1. Establish training for the border areas. Training should be bi-national and 
bilingual and should include joint risk and emergency communications 
between Arizona and Mexico. Establish a bi-national training team; 
trainers should come from both Mexico and the United States; 
2. Conduct a risk-based analysis to determine training needs. Implement a 
course in preparedness response for all personnel, jurisdictions, and first 
responders. Must bring training to all sectors;  
3. Establish a bi-national, web-based continuing education calendar. Design, 
develop, and conduct bi-national exercises and simulations to evaluate 
training and disaster preparedness. There must be bi-national proficiency 
disaster drills every six months. Drill training will involve situations such 
as chemical leak drills, natural disasters and terrorist attacks in both the 
United States and Mexico.  
3. Strategic Goal #3: Communications 
This goal focuses on strengthening communications and information sharing with 
BAERTF stakeholders and establishing communications linkage between both countries. 
BAERTF will implement the following: 
1. Create and distribute contact lists and integrate a directory of key 
stakeholders along the border. The directory should include individual 
positions and responsibilities, and be updated in a timely manner by the 
BAERTF, at a minimum of every three months; 
2. Translate materials to avoid language barriers. Communications should 
include Internet, satellite telephones, cellular phones, internal radio 
communications, and videoconferences. Form a local workgroup or 
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committee with professionals from both countries to determine the 
communication channels and joint operations for a communication 
network; 
3. Share access to radio frequencies and ensure radio compatibility. Establish 
and allow for bi-national communications at the local level, including civil 
protection, fire departments, medical doctors, epidemiologists, federal and 
state police, and federal and local representatives of risk communication. 
Rapid-response plans should be distributed to all emergency response 
personnel and health officials. 
4. Strategic Goal #4: Chain of Command 
This goal focuses on strengthening collaborative efforts and creating a chain of 
command system by incorporating NIMS in responding to major incidents such as an 
emergency or natural disaster. BAERTF will implement the following: 
1. Develop protocols and a communications plan for public distribution of 
information, including panic control. Conduct joint media briefings. The 
public information staff should be bilingual; 
2. Risk communications in both countries should be through one 
spokesperson and include a backup. Subject matter experts should support 
spokespersons. Establish a bi-national point of contact for each emergency 
response team on either side of the border. Determine channels of 
communication, both internally and externally;  
3. Incorporate the use of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
NIMS unifies and institutionalizes a system of preparedness and response across 
the state and the nation. This system is the nationally accepted framework for preparing 
for and responding to hazards, regardless of size or complexity. NIMS is a 
comprehensive, national approach to incident management that is applicable at all 
jurisdictional levels and across functional disciplines. NIMS allows local officials in 
jurisdictions across the nation to use common terminology and command structures and 
to share resources when responding to a hazard. NIMS is made up of several components, 
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including command and management, preparedness, resource management, 
communications and information management, supporting technologies, and ongoing 
management and maintenance. NIMS incorporates common systems for incident 
command, multiagency coordination, and public information (Perry, 2005–2010). 
F. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED 
STRATEGIC PLAN 
In the aftermath of 9/11, many homeland security planners tried different 
approaches to contingency planning by using a “scenario-based” planning process that 
focused on what events could happen. This approach was based on “what if” drills as 
discussed by Goss (2005, p. 4): 
‘These ‘what if’ contingency plans have the additional benefit of not 
requiring a detailed threat assessment, as issues and questions concerning 
the threat can be mitigated by making assumptions to fit the scenario. This 
effort has run into resistance from homeland security planners who claim 
that “one size does not fit all.’ The scenario-based approach makes claims 
of flexibility with “ways that allow them to be adapted to local 
conditions,” but offers a framework of set tasks and agency roles that 
cannot be easily modified. City planners and decision-makers are quick to 
point out that each city is in fact unique in its infrastructure, assets, 
resources, and vulnerability. The challenge for any scenario-based 
approach is to be able to plan with certainty that the scenarios developed 
will be the scenarios faced. Therefore, neither “threat-based” nor 
“scenario-based” planning will work effectively for homeland defense or 
homeland security planning because the asymmetric threat cannot be used 
as a template. Advocates of capabilities-based planning assert that it is this 
strong potential for the threat to achieve surprise by asymmetric means 
that makes threat-based and scenario-based planning a poor match for the 
needs of emerging planning challenges like homeland defense and 
homeland security.  
With safety personnel armed with newly developed response protocols, and the 
necessary tools to avert threats, the United States and Mexico will share a renewed 
confidence in their ability to protect their communities, their families, and their borders. 
This BAERTF-proposed plan also provides the reassurance that two sides along 
international boundaries can come together, recognize universal necessities, and establish 
a formal working agreement toward the achievement of common goals. 
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The first disadvantage that will be met will be the lack of equipment, outdated 
equipment, and a fundamental deficiency of understanding regarding certain response 
capabilities. The second disadvantage will be the need for continuous training exercises 
to maintain proficiency and maintenance of such equipment. Finally, responding to the 
aftermath caused by weapons of mass destructions is an unfamiliar process, and 
continued education for the BAERTF could encounter funding problems, especially since 
we are dealing with national and federal issues and jurisdictions that are already short 
staffed and short of financial resources. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the Bi-National Arizona Emergency Response Task Force 
(BAERTF) and strategic plan is to launch a statewide, bi-national resource team to assist 
border jurisdictions in both the United States and northern Mexico to respond to major 
incidents that could potentially overwhelm local resources. The ultimate goal is to deliver 
a timely, supportive response to any jurisdiction on either side of the Arizona-Mexico 
border that experiences a disaster, terrorist-based or otherwise, that overwhelms the local 
response and to provide automatic, mutual-aid capability and establish appropriate 
communications linkage between both countries. 
With the BAERTF armed with effective rapid response protocols, and the 
necessary tools to avert threats, both the United States and Mexico will continue to share 
a renewed confidence in their ability to protect their communities, their families, and 
their borders. This plan if implemented can provide reassurance along both sides of the 
international boundary. The coming together of both nations will bring attention to 
universal necessities and establish a formal working agreement directed toward the 
achievement of common goals. 
The growing importance and role of homeland security in the bi-national public 
sector cannot be overstated in a contemporary context, particularly with the increasingly 
pervasive danger of potentially life-threatening disasters in our everyday lives. 
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